Do signs have styles? [draft of 26 October 2017, not for publication]

1. Before I began to type the first letter of the first word in the question for the title of this essay, I was forced into a series of choices that made its answer apparently obvious. Calibri or Century Gothic? What font size? Which colour? What spacing? Where to start on the page? Capital or lower case? Were I to open the next paragraph with a capitalised Gothic YES or lower case Roman yes there would be a difference of style for the sign and – at the very least – a difference of tone, and hence, just for starters, minor differences in meaning and implications.

2. Over the last few years, I have defended a new model for signs as processes. According to it, font, font size, tone, colour and even meaning of signs are secondary to and follow from the processes surrounding them. No sign simply has a font or a colour as an element of style. Instead, each sign is a series of selections (of fonts, sizes, positions, colours and places) surrounded by multiple processes that must be considered to be part of the sign and its style. Signs do not therefore simply have style. They cannot be given a style once and for all. Signs are interventions within processes where they become style – fleetingly and changeably. Like a scarf, or type of rhyme, a sign acquires style in combination with an environment, where style grows, changes and fades, like a passing fashion.

3. Selections such as font and colour only become part of the style of the sign when the processes around those choices are taken into account. Characteristic features of the sign are always subservient to those wider processes, mapped according to competing diagrams. These trace paths of transformation from the sign through its environment, like the map of the spread of a disease, or the tracing of the social consequences of a new invention, or a chart of the growth of a new ideology. If a sign has a style, it is to be found in diagrams of its effects, not limited to traditional stylistic properties. Style belongs to a pattern of effects as they unfold across diagrams; it is not a property limited to the boundaries of individual signs, or even chains of signs. The font chosen for a letter matters, but the choice is only significant because of its diagrammatical effects. Does the font set-off new processes across the diagram? Does it increase the pulse of readers? How does it alter the power of other letters and phrases?

4. The traditional definition of the sign has two aspects that the process definition breaks with: focus on form or manner, and limitation to an artefact. In listing different but related meanings for style, the Oxford English Dictionary always returns to the form and manner of something made: a ‘manner of writing’, ‘features belonging to form rather than expression’, ‘a manner of discourse’, ‘a manner or fashion’, ‘a mode or form of skilled construction’, ‘a type of architecture’, ‘a manner of executing a task’, ‘a mode of deportment or behaviour’, ‘a fashionable air, deportment, appearance’, ‘a person’s characteristic bearing [or] demeanour’. In these definitions, style is an appearance and a characteristic of something manufactured. It is also a means of classifying things and appearances: style is ‘a kind, sort or type’. For the process approach the error here is two-fold. Style should be about the consequences of manner. It should not be limited to made things, but rather extended to

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1 James Williams, A Process Philosophy of Signs, Edinburgh University Press, 2016. See also James Williams, ‘What is a diagram (for a sign)?’ Parrhesia, 23, 2016, pp 41-61
their effects. If we are to speak of form and style, we should invoke the forms of a dynamic transformation, rather than a type of appearance.

5. There’s a connection between the process philosophy of the sign and Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of style in *Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles*. Derrida looks to discarded dictionary definitions of style, alongside a reading of Heidegger’s *Nietzsche* and a critical reflection on Nietzsche, woman and truth. He is interested in older senses of the word, now forgotten or abandoned. Derrida returns to the roots of ‘style’ as stylus and spur, pointed object, ships’ prow, and engraving tool. For him, to interpret Nietzsche’s style we must sense it as a weapon, both of attack and defence. Style punctures outwards, like a stiletto, and parries onslaughts, like a sea-break. Interpretations founder on Nietzsche’s styles, yet they are his way to approach veiled truths. Among the many lessons of Derrida’s short study is the idea that style cannot be understood as mere appearance (one of the themes of Nietzsche’s aphorisms on women and truth). Style must be followed in its violence – as castrating the desire to know the truth – and in its powers of puncture and inscription: ‘... the question of style as question of writing, the question of a spurring operation, more powerful than any content, any thesis and any meaning.’

6. Imagine a crowd of experts waiting outside Searle’s famous Chinese room for the next message to come from within. The room is a sealed box with an aperture for messages. The box spits out answers in response to questions we post into it. Unlike Searle, we are not interested in what goes on in the box, but in what happens when the reply is posted back. When a missive arrives, it will have unexpected features. We knew enough to ask the question, but not enough to be aware of the right response. The first answer slides through the opening. It has a distinctive style: bright splashes of red and gold ink, a swish surrounded by lesser dots against a shaded, textured, background, like a stained woodcut. Waiting experts squabble over the sign; their existence depends on maintaining position as a privileged interpreter. They offer competing theories about the meaning of the sign and its relation to prior ones. They return to the question and to the reason we posed it. For the process account, the learned theories, the skirmishes, their effects and the stakes are all elements of the diagram of the sign. We could draw a map situating each expert in these processes as their battle unfolds. In the dispute, the sign is not yet a fixed meaning, a given style, a settled correspondence between signifier and signified, or a placeholder within a system or structure of signs. It is a wave of effects on other signs, on bodies, ideas, power relations, feelings, places, spaces, objects, animals, plants and people. If the sign has a style it is in the turmoil around the box. The style is not limited to red and gold colours. Instead, as in any fashion and every mode of expression, we have to read style in the faces, gestures and actions of onlookers. A style cannot be said to be shocking without the shock. The sign does not arrive ready-made and finished; like the ready-made in art, it arrives ready to be unmade. The sign arrives laden with potential, including potential styles.

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4 *Éperons: les styles de Nietzsche*, p 59
5 Ibid. p 86 [my translation]
6 ‘From the external point of view -- from the point of view of someone reading my "answers" -- the answers to the Chinese questions and the English questions are equally good.’ Searle, John. R. ‘Minds, brains, and programs’ *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 3 (3), 1980, pp 417-457, p 418
7. The process sign is a selection and a series of dynamic effects. Since these effects run through dense and infinite fields of elements, the sign must be rendered as a series of diagrams mapping those effects. The diagrams are speculative descriptions of a dynamic process; they can be standard lines of movements, but they can also be narratives or artistic expressions. In addition, the sign is all the general theories about the selection, effects and diagrams, including those denying them as process. Finally, the sign is in the outer shield of arguments between speculative diagrams and general theories. The sign is all of the following: a selection; the effects of the selection; diagrams of those effects; and general arguments for and against each of those aspects.

8. The set for a sign – the set giving the sign its name – could be {red, times new roman, lower case, “a”, 12 point}. Its traditional style would be the four non-letter elements. However, none of this amounts to its style as process sign. To get to style we have to explain how the selection determines a style for dynamic effects. Traditional stylistic forms are precursors to effects modelled by diagrams, in relation to general theories and their operation at the level of external debates. If there is to be a style for process signs, it will have to be a way of describing the style of those effects, within diagrams and in relation to general theories.

9. A general theory is an intervention on the sign as process. The theory seeks to define the sign and therefore set it within given boundaries. It might attempt to bolster the sign and argue for its importance, or oppose it and limit its scope as process, or even deny its status as process at all. The theory might offer norms for the sign and assign ethical value to it, but even the banning order on a sign and the theories justifying the ban are part of its style. A gesture becomes revolutionary or obscene when there is a reaction to it. Among some of the most controversial signs of the last decades, styles of sexuality, sex and gender grow out of and interact with systems of custom, theory and laws trying to control them. So the relation of forces between theory and the sign shapes its style and modulates its intensity. The impact of an act changes when it is forbidden, or permitted – the same is true for style.

10. The formal ways of describing the dynamism of style are number, extension and contrast. The style of a sign alters when it is replicated. Style changes when we pass from unique, to copied, to endlessly reproduced (the only dashing white shirt at the party; two white-shirted beaux cross paths; everyone in white or else…) The extension of a style is the breadth of its effects; when we go from unique on this island, to unique for this country, to without equal anywhere on earth. Contrast describes differences in intensity around the sign: the degree of difference with its surroundings. A sign can be unique but still fade into the background; it can be endlessly reproduced and yet have terrifying effects, like an order to leave, posted on door after door.

11. The power of intervention of a theory on a sign depends partly on critical debates. An argument over an object or ritual is also an argument over its style as a process of change within wider society. We see this starkly in contemporary debates about cultural appropriation, where theories about

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7 Herbert Spencer’s philosophy of style is based on a general theory of style, with a principle of economy based on physical ideas about the available mental energy of readers: ‘This superiority of specific expression is clearly due to a saving of the effort to translate words into thoughts.’ Herbert Spencer, *Philosophy of Style: an Essay*, New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1884, p 15
exploitation and disregard for cultural signs can return a sign from the exotic to deeper cultural and historical senses and styles.

12. We feel style as process in the moments before sending an important communication. When penning a love letter or a resignation we hesitate, wondering about the best medium and style. On paper or by email? Short or at length? Ink or pencil? Factual or heartfelt? The hesitancy is caused by a premonition of the effects of the message. We draw diagrams in our minds of the effects of our choices: the anger at being turned down by email; the sadness at seeing a lover’s handwriting for the last time; words turned around and around, as understanding or justification is sought. Style is not a settled fact, but rather the way formal differences play out in life.

13. Style isn’t restricted to the medium. It spreads out beyond lines of communication and through the world it touches. We say ‘that’s just typical of their style: to have broken the relationship over Twitter’ to indicate repercussions, not modes. Style is not the limitation of 150 characters exchanged online, but their connections to wider behaviour; not a part of something, but the description of a type of movement through a world. Style is in the bullying, not mere words.

14. Style is not in the question ‘Which style?’ It is in the problem ‘How does style transform this world?’ The question of style assumes a definite answer: the right pigeon hole. A problem is different. It doesn’t take answers for granted, but rather raises the possibility of the impossibility of a firm answer, by describing the field that makes impossibility plausible. Formal answers to the question of style are not satisfactory for process signs. Features such as font, colour and shape, or epoch, type and manner, are descriptors of rigid states. They fix the sign. Processes are dynamic and context-driven. The effects they trace are about movements across environments, rather than states of an object. The sign caused a dimming of our hopes, not the sign was blue.

15. Processes should be understood as continuous and immanent. Continuity implies that all elements and processes are in touch with one another. Every change in a particular process has effects across all others. Continuity denies the existence of independent processes. Immanence denies the existence of separate fields. The distinction between meaning and style is easier to maintain when dealing with signs limited by boundaries and typologies. The sign has a meaning, but the style in which it is communicated can alter. In the process sign, style and meaning cannot have this simple relation, because the process of style will necessarily have an effect on the process of meaning. For each sign, meaning is changed across each of the defining stages of the sign: in unconditioned selection, in diagrams and in general theories and their debates.

16. Undetermined selection in signs and continuity and multiplicity in their processes are the basis for a rejection of the individuality of the author as determinant of style. This lure has been revived recently through Manfred Frank’s rediscovery, in Schleiermacher, of the idea of style as necessitating forms of divination: “‘Divination” appears in the context of a theory of “style”... By “style” Schleiermacher means the “treatment of language” with reference to how the speaker brings “his own particular way of understanding the object... into the use and thus also into his treatment
of language”. For Frank, style gives universal grammatical forms and signs their ‘particular meaning’ through ‘unique combination’. His definition depends on two theses: unique style must have an authorial origin and there is a valid distinction between universal signs and particular meanings. The opposite view is that there are no universal signs, only successions of connected processes in unique patterns. There is no valid distinction between the particular and the universal supporting the idea of style as the absolute and unique mark of the individual. The process philosophy of signs stands against nostalgia for the uniquely valuable individual. There are no such individuals, only multiplicities of processes we can project individuality on to, if we happen to suffer from a yearning for it.

17. The principle of unconditioned selection comes before any other principle, law or code, including laws about style. It states that the selection of elements for the naming set of a sign is free of preconditions. By definition, anything can be included in or excluded from the set. Laws denying this condition only come back in general theories that are to be taken into account after selections and their diagrams. Unconditioned selection is the principle of the new, explaining counterfactual signs and untethered creativity.

18. Unconditioned selection does not imply that signs can have no style or no meaning in terms of their effects. Every sign must have some kind of impact on style and meaning. When a new sign is coined different elements can be drawn out and given priority. These need not include meaning or style, but they will always have an impact on them. Sets name and differentiate signs, but never sufficiently, or as independent from one another.

19. The definition of the process sign is speculative. It is offered as a model for experimentation and testing. The wager is that the process account gives a more open, accurate and powerful definition of the sign. Power is applicability alongside the capacity to transform ways of thinking and perceiving. The same wager holds for style. The model of style as process and as an account of the dynamic effect of signs removes signs from categories and types of appearance, with their specific realms – usually aesthetic ones – and particular functions – most often individual modes of presentation. Against this typological ideal, style as process belongs to every sign, since it describes the particular way in which each sign takes effect. Style should be a description of how all signs affect the world, rather than a description of formal features of some privileged artefacts.

20. Art Nouveau, for instance, should not be defined simply according to a type (flowing natural curves in syncopated rhythms, ‘of sinuous asymmetrical lines based on plant forms’) but through dynamic effects that bring natural forms into built environments and beyond. It is an art of effects, of softening and lightness, transforming ideas and experiences of the natural and manufactured worlds, sometimes with paradoxical effects of distancing and idealisation. It is also a style that

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9 Ibid. p 19
fractures society, providing new appearances for wealth, rarity and decoration, in tension with demands for better conditions for all, and a more egalitarian and efficient architecture. Art Nouveau isn’t only a ‘look’. It is an effect within worlds, with a violent exclusivity, under the illusion of universal images of natural beneficence.

21. Since styles and meanings can be selected at will into the set that names a process sign, we can name process signs with no style: {meaning, ...} We can name a process sign with no meaning, {style, ...} Yet the sign with no style will have style effects, just as the homeless and poor at the opera door change the ‘style’ of the swanky patrons passing into the foyer. The sign with no meaning will have an effect on meanings, like indecipherable graffiti on city walls prompting feeling of disquiet and insecurity, or hope for change.

22. The formal possibility of a sign defined (with a selected set) as having no style mustn’t be confused with the idea of writing with no style. The title of Roland Barthes’s early book The Degree Zero of Writing could lead us to think that he was aiming for absence of style, implying a void of style-effects. His history of style in French literature is much closer to a political process account than a typological analysis. Each stage of French style – in its regression to a degree zero – is also a moment in the political engagement of literature: towards a new bourgeoisie; as revolutionary art; as rediscovery of the human condition with Camus, ‘where the problem of the human is uncovered and delivered without colour.’ For Barthes, the non-style of the modern writers of degree zero literature is a political project. It aims for homogeneity in its effects: ‘the search for a non-style, or oral style, of a zero degree or spoken degree of writing, is in sum the anticipation of an absolutely homogeneous state of society...’

23. The principle of undetermined selection has two further consequences. Style can always be altered within any given situation through the selection of new signs. This is a direct challenge to accounts of style as limited by situation, whether cultural, material or through custom and law. There are no such limits and there is always potential for a new sign and a new style breaking with those that came before them. The degree of style can be altered, with signs divested of what counts as recognised style at any given time. Degree indicates the intensity of the effects and process of particular features of style. By varying the elements in the naming set we can change style and seek to alter its effects. The tyranny of styles can always be escaped. We can always create new signs against former styles, even if each new sign must necessarily play out in old worlds.

24. Where we once drew up tables of shared features, inheritances, borrowings and ruptures, we should now follow traces of events, changes in relations and transformations of elements. It is not how different styles appear in a world that matters; it is how different styles play out. The dominance of static typologies will be hard to shake. Even a dynamic style like futurism is still defined according to its main pronouncements (denunciation of the past, Marinetti embracing fascism), features (synaesthesia and kinesthesia, speed and technology), genetic lines (Neo-

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13 Ibid. pp 223-4
impressionism, Cubism) and main artists and works (Balla, Boccioni and Severini). These typological definitions miss futurism as social, political and aesthetic force: what it did and how it did it, rather than what it looked like and said. To track the play of style, we should turn away from the works, from features of formal style, to the style of their transformation of audiences and environments, and then back again, always experimenting with focus, aim and depth.

25. Wittgenstein’s remarks on style demonstrate the old way of thinking about style, as something we have, something that belongs to us, rather than as a projection into the world, style defined by an exercise on the world. He is still a thinker of style-of, rather than style-through: “Le style c’est l’homme”, “Le style c’est l’homme même”. The first expression has cheap epigrammatic brevity. The second, correct version opens up quite a different perspective. It says that a man’s style is a picture of him. Wittgenstein’s analysis of Buffon’s famous epigram is flawed in its appeal to the concept of picture, where style and man are identified in a representation: the man as the pictured thing. Dorothy Parker’s wisecracks do not define her style; they are a thin portrait. Her style is in the transformations her words brought upon others, through her poetry and stories. When we impose clichés of style we mount a person, when we should be freeing them to range further. Wittgenstein’s unhappiness with his own style is a symptom of this misunderstanding. He thought style was something we possessed: ‘You have to accept the faults in your own style. Almost like the blemishes in your own face.’ The opposite is true. Like our faces, we can only exercise style out in the world, in an ongoing experimentation with expression and effects.

26. In Discours sur le style, Buffon argues against style as process and as becoming in the name of eternity. The early Enlightenment scientist knew that inventions, discoveries, technologies and scientific ideas are transmuted far beyond the original, ‘because knowledge, facts and discoveries are easily taken away. They are transportable and even benefit from implementation by more skilled hands.’ If something is to remain of the original, it has to be unalterable, not the content of the thought, but its individual and rare form: ‘... style can therefore neither be taken away, nor transported, nor altered: if it is elevated, noble, sublime, the author will also be admired for all time.’ There’s a twist missed in the popular and shortened version of Buffon’s epigram, cutting out a final reason: ‘since truth alone is durable and even eternal.’ Sublime style must be drawn from a sublime subject – from eternal truths and laws, and great figures and events – not from the individuality of the author. Buffon speaks of style as a natural scientist, but his objection only counts if truth itself is invariant, if there are eternal laws (for science and philosophy) and eternally great figures and events (for history). Buffon is only partly right. Style is in conflict with eternal and general truths.

16 Culture and Value, p 76e
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
27. If we shouldn’t think of style as something eternal or proper, can we instead think of it as an emergent property? Maybe style is an eigenvalue, determined by vectors that only change in scale when transformed by a function: ‘eigenorganizations, as sets of temporary and local invariants within a complex field of vectorial transformations and processes.’\(^{20}\) Style would then still be a process, but one defined by scalable, but otherwise unchanging directions and movements in the relation of an individual to its environment. Style as eigenvalue would emerge through habitual repetitions and be open to change, both in terms of reinforcement and destruction. This eigenstyle is acquired over time through actions and effects. The fundamental questions of style would then become whether to strengthen or weaken eigenstyle as a relation to an environment.

28. There are critical differences between pure process philosophy of the sign, as I have defined it, and emergent process accounts. Eigenstyle is a return to characteristic forms, because eigenvalues determine individuality through characteristic vectors. Despite its debt to process, this is a return to the proper manner of an artefact. Eigenstyle is less open to change and to challenge than style in the pure process account, as defined by the unconditioned naming set of a sign. According to the eigenvalue account there is at least local determination of possible futures for styles in relation to their environments. This restriction is denied in the pure process philosophy. The emergent account is a limitation on explanation and creation as ways of connecting style and environment, because justification must be according to laws of emergence, or of how the ‘eigen’ must come about.

29. In the pure process philosophy, diagrams of the effects of styles are in principle open and free speculations about the relation of style to environment. If the distinction between eigenvalues and environments is given primacy over process, then we cannot have a fully continuous and immanent definition of process. Shifts in type and level between eigenvalue and non-eigenvalue processes for an individual give rise to natural distinctions. This limitation of process, immanence and continuity in eigenstyle and emergence can be traced back to their source in autopoiesis, as explanation for individual lives through external membranes and internal regulation. Style should never be seen as a distinction from the outside or as an internal rule.

30. In the context of a human life, the distinctions between pure process philosophy and emergent process philosophy can be illustrated through Hanjo Berressem’s reading of Dilthey on biography: ‘Comparable to the way in which chaotically/Irregularly distributed photons are entrained into a highly “vectorized” laser beam, the autobiographical construction of the “meaning of a life” entrains events into a vectorized and vectorizing narrative.’\(^{21}\) Entrainment is a limitation on the selection of signs that the pure process definition seeks to avoid: we can break with our narrative vectors in radical ways. A life doesn’t have a characteristic meaning, vectorial or other. It has new effects that different diagrams can explain and chart in multiple ways. We shouldn’t think of life as autopoiesis, separated in some way from a wider environment, but rather as continuous processes determining


an infinite field of immanence, where any privileged (and enchained) life is a speculative imposition. The threat of natural kinds lurks within eigenvalues and autopoiesis, despite their claims to process and individuality.

31. Borrowing from mathematical and physical versions of eigenvalues, Berressem’s argument depends on a logical opposition: either chaos or eigenvalues. For the pure process philosophy, this is a false opposition. Each sign brings degrees of relative order to all things as related processes: there is never total chaos or a stable eigenvalue. This relative order doesn’t define beings according to their proper eigenvalues, but rather by tracing wide patterns of changes. In the pure process philosophy of the sign, any eigenstyle is a diagram for style rather than the sign itself, since this sign is the potential for many narratives rather than the result of habituation. The sign is always potential for narration – any narrative – rather than the possibility of proper eigenvalue.

32. For diagrams of the dynamic effects of a sign, there is no prior distinction between style and meaning. Everything is put into play in the same plane or world. Transformations brought about by the sign bring all styles and meanings into degrees of interaction, with each other and everything else. Diagrams for signs cannot be two-field realms of correspondences between style and meaning. They are manifold webs of changes across all neighbourhoods of the diagram and each thing on it. Every selected sign is therefore an individual effect on interactions of styles, meanings, elements, places, directions and degrees. It is never simply this message in that style, but rather this wave of effects running through all things.

32. When you select a hat to go with an outfit, you cannot restrict its effect to either a closed realm of style, or a closed realm of meaning, or a limited realm of interactions. The colour and shape of the hat have effects on all other clothing colours and shapes, but also on much more unexpected things such as bodily movements and types of gesture. You can slouch much better in some hats than others. Other hats convey menace and make the selection of gesture delicate. You were doing just fine in that cap, until you decided to salute...

34. A hat does not only have effects on current clothes and gestures, and their effects on people around you. It also has effects on architectural and natural spaces. That hat is wrong for an opera house, just like when you wore that stupid deer-stalker to the zoo. There are also effects over time, since one of the most important tests for fashion is historical reference and innovation. It’s just not her without the red beret she lost last year. There are also effects across spaces and bodies. His poise comes from balancing that bowler hat all those years. This web of aesthetic, bodily and spatial effects also transforms things we normally associate with meaning, such as conveying a sense like ‘serious’ or ‘playful’, or achieving a specific goal such as ‘warm’ or ‘cool’.

35. It is impossible for dynamic effects to be solely about style and meaning. It is also impossible for them not to have connections to style and meaning. However, each diagram of these effects can give them prominence or pull away from them. A diagram might focus on fashion or downplay it. It might seek to interpret changes in meaning, or attempt to give a purely physical description of dynamic transformations. Style therefore becomes one of the stakes of differences between diagrams. It is always possible for a diagram to draw attention to style (understood in a traditional
sense) and it is always possible for diagrams to challenge one another over the role they assign to style.

36. When we choose the heel height for shoes a series of properties allow us to define style: thin, thick, raked, full, short, flat, high, kitten, stiletto. But how do you describe the selection itself, in particular when it is determined as free or unconditioned? How do you describe the effects of the selection as style? If we think of selection by humans, we have some criteria reflecting character and behaviour, such as bold or timid. For unconditioned selection, we have to refer to the selection itself rather than the selector. Style is never about an actor; only about an act and its effects (including those on the actor, or on the actor as sign).

37. Selection is a precondition for style in the process sign, because it allows for a sign to be determined. This condition is only a preparation for style as a description of the dynamic effects of the selected sign. We require an account of the features of a building in order to begin to talk about it, but to understand its processes we need to consider it at work in an environment of people, places, times, climates, political systems, and changing materials and movements. The vocabulary of appearance type and character, of spatial organisation and division, dominant in static accounts of style is useless when turning to process. A different language is necessary to describe style as an effect across diagrams of environment.

38. The new process vocabulary for style will be of movements, directions, transformations, events, affects and intensities. It will owe more to the language of strategy and encounter, than to fixed geometry and content. In the latter, a field might be divided according to shapes then filled with relevant content: coloured zones and textured materials then associated with socially or scientifically derived meanings. For process style, these divisions and contents are subject to dynamic changes. It’s these alterations and the conflicts around them that the new language of style must express. The difference is between a description of the dress of the newcomer to the ball and the description of the ripples of shock and dismay of the other ball-goers, upstaged by a stranger: fear, jealousy, attractions, repulsions, new alliances, retrenchments on old values, the urge to copy and the urge to destroy – *rip her to shreds*.

James Williams, Edinburgh, October 2017